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Abstract 
 
We study how misaligned language between the investor and the firm contributes to the 
foreign investor bias.  In particular, we document a significant US institutional investor bias 
against firms located in Quebec relative to firms located in the Rest of Canada (ROC).  The 
differential bias is surprising given that Quebec and the ROC share the same country, 
federal law, stock exchange, accounting standards, and regulatory filings are prepared in 
both English and French; and given that US institutional investors are sophisticated 
investors at close geographic proximity to both Quebec and the ROC.  We also contrast the 
bias of Quebec firms with different levels of French versus English online presence, and we 
contrast the bias of institutional investors located in the UK versus France, to bolster our 
conclusion that incongruent languages are a major source of bias. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 It is well documented that international investors have a bias that causes them to 
underweight foreign stocks in their portfolio, and at a rate that is increasing in the distance 
from their domestic country. Because financial assets are weightless, the distance between 
the foreign investor and the domestic firm must be a proxy for some other, more 
fundamental, source of bias. Country differences in accounting rules, investor protection 
laws, cultural norms, and language have been shown to predict the degree of bias, with 
varying degrees of success. Unfortunately, different countries present packages of these 
attributes, so that comparing the foreign investor bias across countries necessarily varies 
many of these factors at the same time.  
 In this context, foreign investment in Canada presents an interesting case. Since the 
Constitution Act of 1876, Canada has had two official languages, French and English, with 
French spoken primarily in Quebec, and English spoken primarily in the other nine 
provinces. However, the accounting rules are the same across the country, regulatory 
filings and accounting disclosures are prepared in both languages, and the geographic 
distance from most foreign investors is approximately the same. Thus, while some 
differences remain between firms located in Quebec and firms located in the Rest of Canada 
(ROC), many of the differences that arise when comparing firms in different countries do 
not exist.  
 In this study we find a surprising result: despite an almost identical information 
environment and very close geographic proximity, and after controlling for a host of firm-
level characteristics, we find that US institutional investors have a significantly larger bias 
against firms located in Quebec than firms located in the ROC.  In addition, by contrasting 
the bias within Quebec firms based on their English versus French online presence, and by 
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contrasting the bias of UK versus French institutional investors, we show that misaligned 
language between the investor and the firm is a significant cause of the differential bias 
between Quebec and the ROC. Although other studies have found that misaligned language 
may contribute to the foreign investor bias, our study does so with considerably fewer 
alternative explanations, and shows that even sophisticated institutional investors living in 
close proximity to the firms in a foreign country are greatly deterred by a foreign 
language.1 
 Quebec’s place among Canadian provinces is unique.  France colonized the region 
following the explorations of Jacque Cartier. France later ceded the region to the British in 
the Treaty of Paris in 1763; shortly thereafter the British established Quebec. From then to 
present day, approximately 80 percent of Quebec inhabitants speak French as their first 
language (Statistics Canada 2011). This contrasts to roughly two percent Francophones 
elsewhere in Canada.  Coincident with its unique use of the French language, Quebec 
evolved with many unique business characteristics and cultural differences from the ROC. 
Finally, Quebec is an economically important part of Canada, representing 20 percent of 
Canadian GDP in 2012 (Statistics Canada 2012). The question arises, how do foreign 
investors view firms located in Quebec relative to firms located in the ROC? And, to the 
extent that we discover a bias against Quebec firms, can we attribute some of it to 
misaligned language between the foreign investor and the Quebec firm?  
 Our first contrast treats all the unique features of Quebec as a bundle and measures 
the US institutional investor bias against Quebec relative to the bias against the ROC. Using 
                                                        
1 We acknowledge that a region’s language is confounded with other aspects of its culture, and that it would 
be impossible to disentangle language from culture.  We will sometimes use the phrase ‘language/culture’ to 
remind the reader of this. 
 
 
3 
a variety of specifications, we find compelling evidence of an incremental bias against 
Quebec. We find that US investors hold significantly smaller percentages of Quebec firms 
than firms in the ROC and place significantly less weight on Quebec firms than ROC firms in 
their Canadian portfolio. These results hold after controlling for a battery of firm-specific 
characteristics, including whether the firm is cross-listed in the US, whether it has a US 
segment, whether it is incorporated under provincial or federal law, its size, past 
performance, dividend yield, and number of analysts. The magnitude of the bias against 
Quebec relative to the ROC is roughly comparable to the difference between being cross-
listed in the US or not.  In one specification, US ownership of Quebec firms is 35.9 percent 
lower than ownership of ROC firms, and the relative portfolio weight on Quebec firms is 
roughly half the weight put on ROC firms in the Canadian portfolio. 
 Our next two contrasts are aimed at identifying the effect of language/culture on the 
size of the bias against Quebec firms. While it is impossible to isolate and quantify the 
contribution of each unique feature of Quebec firms that might contribute to a foreign 
investor bias, we control for a number of previously documented sources of bias that differ 
between firms within Quebec. For our first language contrast we vary attributes of the firm 
by creating a cross-sectional measure of each Quebec firm’s French presence on the 
Internet. Specifically, we measure the firm’s ‘Frenchness’ by counting the relative number 
of French versus English language documents resulting from a Google search of the 
company name. We find that a 10 percent increase in the firm’s Frenchness is associated 
with a 4.9 percent reduction in US ownership and a 79 percent reduction on the firm’s 
relative portfolio weight in the US investor’s Canadian portfolio. 
 Our second language contrast varies the native language of the foreign investor. By 
contrasting the bias from British institutional investors with the bias from French 
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institutional investors, we change the alignment of language between the firm and investor 
but keep many other sources of bias constant. After controlling for a number of firm 
characteristics, we find that the difference between the British bias and the French bias is 
much larger for Quebec firms than for ROC firms. In one specification the British investors 
favour ROC firms over Quebec firms while French investors favour Quebec firms over ROC 
firms. 
 
2. Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
 French and Poterba (1991) document that, while US firms represent 49 percent of 
the equity capital in the largest 6 markets, US investors allocate 91 percent of their wealth 
to US firms. The tilt of investment portfolios away from global diversification in favour of 
domestic stocks, a phenomenon labeled as the ‘home bias,’ has been shown in many 
different countries (Tesar and Werner 1995).  With respect to US investment in Canada, 
Andrade and Chhaochharia (2010) show that in 2001-2006 US investors allocated one 
percent of their portfolio to Canadian equity, on average, while Canadian equity averaged 
three percent of the world portfolio over the same period. The most robust empirical 
predictor of the degree of bias is simply the geodesic distance between the investor’s 
country and the firm’s country (Portes, Rey and Oh 2001; Portes and Rey 2005).  This 
result, known as the ‘gravity model,’ is generally thought to be a proxy for more 
fundamental determinants of the bias, as financial assets do not have ‘weight.’ The search 
for other notions of distance that capture the true obstacles to foreign investment has 
spawned a rich literature in accounting, economics, and finance. 
 We ask two broad questions: 1) do US investors exhibit a bias against Quebec firms 
that differs from the bias against ROC firms, and 2) does part of any incremental bias 
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against Quebec have a basis in language and its associated cultural attributes? Accordingly, 
we sort the related literature into 1) differences between Quebec and the ROC that may 
contribute to an investor bias, but are relatively constant for firms within Quebec, 2) firm 
attributes or investor attributes that may cause the bias to differ between firms within 
Quebec or across investor locations.  We also briefly discuss forces that have been found in 
previous literature to contribute to an investor bias but are notably absent in our study, 
and forces that influence institutional holdings quite apart from a foreign investor bias. 
 
2.1 SOURCES OF BIAS THAT DIFFER BETWEEN QUEBEC AND REST OF CANADA 
 While contrasting Quebec with the ROC holds many country features constant, there 
are still reasons to believe US investors will have an additional bias against Quebec firms. 
The bundle of differences between Quebec and the ROC collectively form the explanation 
for any differences we may find between the regions. 
 
2.1.1 Language  
 The most obvious difference between Quebec and the ROC is the relative use of 
French; 80 percent of Quebec residents speak French as their first language, as opposed to 
only 2 percent in the ROC (Statistics Canada 2011). Language can proxy for economic 
impediments, such as the cost of gathering information, and it can also proxy for 
psychological impediments – a firm in a region that speaks a different language feels less 
familiar to a foreign investor than a firm in a region that speaks the investor’s domestic 
language. 2  Consistent with this, in a study of 97 Finnish firms and local Finnish investors, 
                                                        
2 Cao, Han, Hirshleifer and Zhang (2011) present a model where the uncertainty created by unfamiliar assets 
induces pessimism in investors, resulting in less demand.  Due to differences in language and culture, it is 
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Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) find the Finnish-speaking household investors favour firms 
that publish their annual reports only in Finnish, while Swedish-speaking household 
investors prefer firms that publish their annual reports only in Swedish (Finland has two 
official languages); in contrast to our results, they find no language affect for institutional 
investors. In global studies, there is mixed evidence that sharing a common language 
impacts the flow of cross-border investment. Aviat and Coeurdacier (2007) find no 
evidence that a common language matters in cross-border trade, Portes and Rey (2005) 
and Daude and Fratzcher (2006) find mixed results for equity investments, while Lane and 
Milesi-Ferretti (2008), Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010), and Aggarwal, Kearney and Lucey 
(2012) find that sharing a common language improves cross-border equity investment.3  
 An interesting feature of the information environment in Canada in this regard is 
that all Quebec firms file regulatory reports in SEDAR in both English and French.  While 
these filings do not constitute the complete information environment, the fact that annual 
and interim financial statements, MD&A discussions, and material change reports are all 
available in English certainly lowers the information processing costs, the information 
advantage of local investors, and the psychological distance of Quebec firms relative to 
firms located in the ROC. Whether this ‘levels the playing field’ for a US Anglophone 
investor is an empirical question. 
 
                                                        
easy to imagine that Quebec companies feel less familiar to US institutional investors than companies located 
in the ROC, and the model would therefore predict lower investment in Quebec companies.  In their model, as 
in our results, the bias can be so extreme that a status quo of zero holdings of Quebec companies is a possible 
equilibrium outcome.  
3 While the results of these global studies are informative, we note that, unlike our study, global studies vary 
many things besides language when they compare across countries.  In addition, these studies aggregate 
investment at the country level, while we collect data at the firm level.  This allows us to control for variation 
in firm characteristics that have been shown to influence institutional investment, and that gets lost in 
country aggregation. 
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2.1.2 Culture 
 Beyond the difference in language, there are many other cultural differences 
between Quebec and the ROC that may influence a US investor’s perception of the firm. 
Two recent global studies of cross-border investment, Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010) and 
Aggarwal et al. (2012), find that cultural distance is a significant deterrent to foreign 
investment in developed countries, even after controlling for geographic distance and the 
effect of sharing a common language.  First introduced by Kogut and Singh (1988), the 
cultural distance measure is derived from Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions, and is often 
used in international business research (e.g., Loree and Guisinger 1995, Barkema and 
Vermeulen 1997, Brouthers and Brouthers 2001).4 For each country, the Hofstede Centre 
gives a score ranging from 1 to 120 on the dimensions of power distance, individualism, 
uncertainty avoidance, and masculinity. The cultural difference between any two countries 
is given as the Euclidean distance between the two countries (i.e. the square root of the 
sum of the squared differences). Along with country scores, the Hofstede Centre gives 
scores for Quebec separately. The four scores for Canada are (39, 80, 52, 48), as compared 
to (54, 73, 45, 60) for Quebec, and (40, 91, 62, 46) for the US. Thus, the cultural distance 
between Canada and the US is 15 and the distance between Quebec and the US is 32. As a 
point of reference, the distance between England and the US is 34. Aggarwal et al. (2012) 
find that the impact of cultural distance is positively related to geographic distance and so 
the close proximity of Canada and the US may render the cultural distinction between 
Quebec and the ROC irrelevant. Further, they find that greater levels of power distance and 
                                                        
4 The cultural measures given in Hofstede, Hofstede and Minkov’s Culture and Organizations (1997) are 
arguably the most common proxies for a country’s culture, having been cited more than 21,000 times 
according to Google Scholar. 
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masculinity in the foreign investment destination country are positively associated with 
more cross-border investment, which would favour Quebec over the ROC because Quebec 
scores higher on these two dimensions.  It is therefore an empirical question whether the 
differences in relatively “close” cultures is sufficient to generate an incremental investor 
bias against Quebec or if the aspects of Quebec’s culture that are more masculine with more 
unequally distributed power actually attracts US investment. 
 
2.1.3 Political Risk 
 The Parti Quebecois (PQ) is a separatist political party in Quebec that advocates 
national sovereignty for Quebec. Such an outcome could raise significant concerns for US 
investors who might fear a disrupted business environment, changes in the relative power 
of labour markets, severe limits on mergers with firms from outside Quebec, and the 
possible expropriation of assets. The PQ first took power in 1976, with a failed referendum 
for secession in 1980.  They were defeated in 1985 but returned to power in 1994 with 
another referendum for secession in 1995.  The referendum failed, but by a margin of less 
than one percent.  The PQ was defeated in 2003, and fell to third place in the 2007 election.  
They won a minority government in 2012, but after calling an election in 2014, they lost 
power to the liberal party, and won only 25 percent of the popular vote, the worst result 
since 1970.  Although the PQ’s political power ebbs and flows, their continued existence as 
a major party in Quebec poses a political risk to foreign investors. 
 Evidence that investors price the political risk associated with Quebec’s intermittent 
sovereignty movement can be found in Beaulieu, Cosset and Essaddam (2006) who study 
stock price movements of Quebec firms around the 1995 referendum. Polls prior to the 
vote could not reliably predict the outcome, making stock returns prior to the vote 
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sensitive to the uncertainty of the outcome, and stock returns surrounding the vote 
sensitive to the resolution of that uncertainty. The authors find that in the week prior to the 
vote, the stock returns of Quebec firms were significantly negative, and then turned 
significantly positive in response to the NO vote on the referendum. In addition, Tirtiroglu, 
Bhabra and Lel (2004) find positive stock price reactions to announcements that a firm is 
moving its headquarters, plants, or divisions away from Quebec. Finally, Graham, Morrill 
and Morrill (2005) find that firms headquartered in Quebec tend to have higher book-to-
price ratios than firms headquartered elsewhere in Canada. Equity prices clearly behave as 
if firms in Quebec come with political risk to foreign investors.  However, prior research 
does not study how Quebec’s political risk, and its associated price discount, influence US 
investor holdings in Quebec versus the ROC.  
 
2.1.4 Investor Protection 
 It has been argued that the foreign investor bias is partly driven by differences in 
the legal protection afforded foreign investors. La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) 
argue that common law countries provide greater investor protection than civil law 
countries, both in terms of specific laws and because of better enforcement. Because 
Quebec is a civil law jurisdiction, while the rest of the Canadian provinces and the federal 
government are common law jurisdictions, this might support a foreign investor bias 
against Quebec. But perhaps not surprisingly, the La Porta measures of investor protection, 
and the conclusions drawn from them, have been disputed by legal scholars. Spamann 
(2010) finds that when the components of the La Porta binary coding system are 
augmented to a richer coding system, there is no longer a difference between common law 
and civil law countries in terms of investor protection. Further, Puri (2009) writes that the 
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La Porta et al. (1997) arguments are too broad-brushed to apply simplistically to Quebec 
versus the ROC. The author notes that the organization of the Canadian Securities 
Administrators in 2003 has helped to harmonize rules across the provinces, and the 
creation of the National Instruments has aided in setting out common regulations. The 
author summarizes by stating 
“This discussion reveals that while Quebec operates a corporate law framework within 
its civil law system that on the surface provides legal rules that do not offer as much 
protection as the federal corporate law statute (or other provincial law statues), the 
Quebec courts have stepped in to judicially craft remedies for shareholders. That being 
said, these QCA remedies are currently more difficult to access or achieve recourse 
under than those in the federal statutory regime.” (Puri 2009 p. 1671). 
 
We simply note that Quebec operates under a different legal system than the ROC and this 
may have economic implications for foreign investors. As discussed in the next section, we 
investigate one component of investor protection that varies across firms within Quebec by 
examining whether there is a difference between firms who incorporate under Quebec 
provincial law versus those who incorporate under federal law.5  
 
2.1.5 Forces that are the same between Quebec and the Rest of Canada 
 Some previously documented drivers of the foreign investor bias are notably absent 
from our study. The accounting rules are the same across Canada, eliminating one 
prominent and frequently studied cause of the bias.6  And, as discussed previously, all 
                                                        
5 An investor protection issue that applies across Canada is that each province has its own security regulatory 
body.  However, under the passport system most provinces agree to respect each other’s registration 
decisions (Canadian Securities Administrators 2014). Ontario does not officially participate in the passport 
system, lobbying instead for a national regulatory system.  The other provinces accept Ontario’s decisions 
while Ontario reserves the right to makes its own decisions. 
6 Bradshaw, Bushee and Miller (2004) find that foreign firms with greater degrees of US GAAP conformity 
have greater levels of US institutional investment.  Interestingly, the authors exclude Canada from the sample, 
arguing that the accounting rules are so close to US standards that there is no meaningful variation.  Similarly, 
Covrig, Defond and Hung (2007) find that foreign ownership of a firm is higher for IAS adopters. And in a 
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significant regulatory disclosures – annual reports, MD&A, material changes - are produced 
in English and filed electronically.  In addition, even if geographic distance from the US is a 
relevant determinant of the foreign investor bias, Quebec and the ROC are approximately 
the same distance from the US. Thus, our study holds constant many factors that have been 
shown to have large influences on the foreign investor bias, and therefore narrows the 
range of explanations for any bias against Quebec that we might observe. 7 
 
2.1.6 Hypothesis 1 
 Collectively, the differences between Quebec and the ROC in language, culture, 
political risk, and investor protection may give rise to a US investor bias against Quebec 
that is over and above a bias against the ROC. Or it may be that the differences between 
these forces are sufficiently minor that, when combined with the uniformity of accounting 
rules and the small and roughly equal geographic distance from the US, there is no 
measurable difference on US investor behaviour.  Therefore, we empirically assess the 
following alternative hypothesis. 
 
H1: The US institutional investor bias against Quebec firms is greater than the bias against 
firms in the Rest of Canada. 
                                                        
changes design, Wahid and Yu (2012) find that international mutual fund ownership increases following 
adoption of IFRS. 
7 Transaction costs are virtually the same for investments in Quebec versus the ROC. However, transaction 
costs have generally been dismissed as a viable cause for the foreign investor bias. Rowland (1999) shows 
that international portfolios turn over faster than similar domestic portfolios, suggesting that transaction 
costs are unlikely to be significantly higher for international investments. 
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2.2 DOES PART OF THE INVESTOR BIAS AGAINST QUEBEC HAVE A BASIS IN LANGUAGE?  
 The collective differences between Quebec and the Rest of Canada, to the extent that 
they exert a differential impact on US investor holdings, are mutually confounded. To gain 
some insight into the relative contribution of different sources of bias, in this section we 
develop hypotheses about forces that will vary within the Quebec firm sample, and forces 
that differ across different foreign investor populations. Our emphasis is on investigating 
how differences in language/culture contribute to the differential foreign investor bias 
against Quebec firms.  We develop two hypotheses in this regard. 
 
2.2.1 Frenchness 
 Prior research has treated language differences between the investor location and 
the firm location as a country-level dichotomous variable – either the investor’s country 
shares the same language as the firm’s country or it does not (e.g. Beugelsdijk and Frijns 
2010 and Aggarwal et al. 2012, Lundholm et al. 2014).  Such an approach cannot 
disentangle language from other regional influences.  To sidestep this problem, we create a 
measure of “Frenchness” for each Quebec firm. Within Quebec, firms can have very 
different levels of English versus French personas. Some firms may translate every 
voluntary disclosure, do interviews in both languages, staff investor relations departments 
with both Anglophones and Francophones, while other firms may do little to help the non-
Francophone investor. We create a comprehensive proxy for this tendency by measuring 
the relative number of firm-related documents on the web published in French or English.  
We describe this measure, labeled ‘Frenchness,’ in detail in the next section, but for now it 
is interesting to note that it ranges from 0 to 67 percent of online documents, suggesting 
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that there is considerable variation in the mix of language that a foreign investor might 
find.8 If the foreign investor bias against Quebec firms varies with the degree of Frenchness, 
this is an indicator that language, along with the cultural aspects that it proxies for, is a 
critical part of the reluctance of US investors to own Quebec stocks.  
 
2.2.2 Type of Incorporation 
 Firms within Quebec can also vary in ways that influence the degree of investor 
protection.  Boubraki, Bozec, Laurin and Rousseau (2011) find that many Quebec firms 
incorporate under federal law rather than under provincial law, arguing that federal law is 
more protective of investor rights.9 Of our Quebec firms, 36 percent are incorporated under 
Quebec provincial law, providing an interesting contrast in investor protection within 
Quebec.  
 
2.2.3 Cross-listing 
 A Quebec firm can also enhance foreign investor protection, and attract US 
investors, by cross-listing its stock on a US exchange. In a global study Ahearne, Griever and 
Warnock (2004) find that US investors hold more equity in countries who have a greater 
fraction of their firms cross-listed in the US, arguing that this lowers the information 
asymmetry.  In a valuation study, King and Segal (2009) find that Tobin’s Q increases for a 
                                                        
8 We observe variation in the mix of French and English despite Quebec’s Bill 101, which requires all 
businesses with more than 50 employees to use French in signage, product labels, manuals, software, 
business communications, along with every employee’s right to conduct his or her work in French.  However, 
a second language is allowed in addition to the mandatory French as long as the French version is the most 
prominent.  
9 In 2011 Quebec replaced the Quebec Companies Act with Quebec Business Corporations Act.  The change 
was designed, in part, to provide better protection to shareholders under provincial law.  As this event 
occurred at the very end of our sample period, we do not attempt to measure its impact. 
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Canadian firm that cross-lists on a US exchange, but only if the firm’s US investor base also 
increases. The authors do not distinguish between Quebec firms and firms from the ROC. 
Further, they attribute their results to an increase in investor recognition (Merton 1987) 
rather than heightened investor protection. Roughly 30 percent of the Quebec firms in our 
sample have cross-listed shares in the US, thus providing another within-Quebec contrast 
on this determinant of the US investor bias. 
 
2.2.4 Differential Exposure to Political Risk 
 Beyond the different types of incorporation, Quebec firms can have different 
exposures to the political risk that Quebec presents.  Beaulieu et al. (2006) find that the 
stock price changes around the 1995 Quebec succession referendum were more 
pronounced for purely domestic Quebec firms than for multinational firms with 
headquarters in Quebec.  They argue that firms whose value is based largely on growth 
options have less exposure to Quebec’s political risk because they can move those growth 
options to other locations at relatively low cost.  Similarly, they argue that a Quebec firm 
that has foreign segments has less exposure to political risk inside Quebec. And, from a US 
investor prospective, the political risk may be lowest if the foreign segment is in the United 
States. Building on the variation in political risk that different Quebec firms pose, Graham 
et al. (2012) use the number of employees, the amount of revenue, and the value of assets 
located in and out of Quebec, as reported in an annual survey by Les Affairs, to measure the 
firm’s political risk. They find lower valuation multiples on the firm’s book value and 
earnings as the amount of assets located in Quebec increases.10 
                                                        
10 The authors of Graham et al. (2005) graciously provided their hand-collected data on the number of 
employees in and out of Quebec.  This variable was insignificant in our tests, probably because intersecting 
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2.2.5 Hypothesis 2 
 Our treatment variable of interest is the firm’s degree of “Frenchness” on the 
Internet. Based on prior research, we also control for differences in the type of 
incorporation, cross-listing in the US, and exposure to political risk (which we proxy for 
with the existence of a US segment). We note that all of these cross-sectional differences 
between firms in Quebec are firm choices and therefore may be the product of even more 
fundamental influences. Also, because these attributes are relatively stable over time, we 
cannot attribute causation. In particular, it may be the case that US investors are repelled 
by firms with high Frenchness, or it may be the case that firms choose a low level of 
Frenchness because they have many US investors, or it may be the case that both variables 
are jointly determined over many years. 
 
H2: The US investor bias against Quebec firms increases with a firm’s “Frenchness.” 
 
2.2.6 Hypothesis 3 
 In global studies of mutual fund holdings, Chan, Corvig and Ng (2005), Beugelsdijk 
and Frijns (2010), and Aggarwal et al. (2012) find that sharing a common language reduces 
the investor bias against foreign countries.  Note that these results measure cross-border 
investments at the country level. They do not take into account firm-level attributes, such 
as the firm’s location within the country, the firm choices outlined in hypothesis two, or the 
host of other firm attributes that have been shown to influence institutional investment (as 
                                                        
this data with ours greatly reduced the sample size. More importantly, none of our results where significantly 
affected. 
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discussed next). If misaligned language contributes to a foreign investor bias, we would 
expect the bias against Quebec to be stronger for investors residing in an Anglophone 
country than for investors residing in a Francophone country.  We choose France and the 
UK as the investor locations for this contrast because they each have a reasonable number 
of institutional investors and they are approximately the same geodesic distance from 
Canada. In addition, by choosing two countries that are significantly further from Canada 
than the US we reduce the potential level of familiarity that proximity alone may have 
provided the US investor. Finally, note that if any of the non-language features of Quebec 
(political risk, investor protection, etc.) are the root cause of the bias then this is the same 
for French and British investors, and we would find no difference. 
 
H3: The bias against Quebec firms, relative to the bias against firms in the Rest of Canada, is 
greater for British institutional investors than it is for French institutional investors. 
 
2.3 DETERMINANTS OF INSTITUTIONAL HOLDINGS UNRELATED TO HOME BIAS  
 Kang and Stulz (1997) and Bradshaw et al. (2004) identify a number of firm-specific 
factors that attract institutional investors.  And, in a study of Swedish firms’ foreign 
ownership, Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) find that many of the firm attributes that are 
attractive to institutional investors in their domestic portfolios (e.g. size, low dividend 
payout) are also present in the Swedish firms that are targeted by foreign investors, 
particularly US investors.  They argue that some previous evidence regarding a foreign 
investor home bias is actually just an institutional investor bias in favour of certain firm-
specific attributes found in foreign firms.  For this reason, in addition to the variables 
discussed above, we control for the firm-specific factors found in these studies.  We also 
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include industry fixed effects to account for the different mix of industries in Quebec versus 
the ROC, and we include the provincial marginal tax rate as a proxy for business costs that 
vary across provinces. And, to satisfy the exclusion restriction in the two-stage models that 
follow, we use an indicator for whether the firm is part of the S&PTSX index when modeling 
the decision for institutional ownership to be zero or positive.  
 
3. Research Design 
3.1 THE DEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 There are two common ways to measure the degree of foreign investor bias against 
a domestic stock: 1) the percent of shares held by specific foreign investors (either in the 
US, the UK or France), and 2) the portfolio weight of the firm in the foreign investor’s 
Canadian holdings relative to the weight of the firm in the Canadian market. The 
benchmark for both ratios is given by the international CAPM; in this model every investor 
should hold the market-value-weighted world portfolio. In this case the percent of shares 
held by specific foreign investors should be constant across all firms in Canada, regardless 
of whether they are in Quebec or ROC. The percent of shares held is used by Bradshaw et al. 
(2004) to study how accounting differences impact the home bias and by DeFond, Hu and 
Li (2011) to study the impact of mandatory IFRS adoption in the European Union. It is the 
most commonly used measure in the institutional ownership literature (see Bushee 1998 
and 2001).  Similarly, under the international CAPM the relative portfolio weight should be 
one for all securities, regardless of their location within Canada. The relative portfolio 
weight is used in Dahlquist and Robertsson (2001) to study how firm characteristics 
influence foreign investor ownership in Sweden. It is a firm-level version of the country-
level variable used in most economics studies of aggregate cross-border investment, 
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including Dahlquist, Pinkowitz, Stulz and Williamson (2003), Chan et al. (2005), and 
Beugelsdijk and Frijns (2010). 
 Note that a general home bias against Canada will not change the relative value 
between Quebec and ROC for either measure; it depresses the percent of shares held 
equally across all Canadian firms and it has no effect on the relative portfolio weight 
because the allocated share of wealth is relative to the investor’s holdings in Canada. The 
first measure is from a firm perspective – who owns the firm’s shares.  The second measure 
is from the investor’s perspective – how do they allocate their wealth between Canadian 
firms?  In both cases, the unit of observation is the firm-year because we only consider one 
group of foreign investors at a time.  
 For a given Canadian firm and year, the percent of shares held, PCT_US, is defined as 
the number of shares held by U.S. institutional investors, measured as of the institutional 
report date closest to the fiscal year end, divided by the float-adjusted shares. Float-
adjusted shares are shares outstanding less the number of shares held by ‘control blocks’ at 
the end of the fiscal year (COMPUSTAT item CSFSM). Control blocks are assumed to be held 
partly for strategic and not solely for investment purposes; consequently, they are not 
generally available for sale to foreign investors.11 Dahlquist et al. (2003) show that investor 
bias estimates based on the total shares outstanding severely distort the result toward a 
biased measure of investment even if no bias is actually present, and Attig (2007) presents 
evidence that closely held shares are particularly prevalent in Quebec. We use float-
                                                        
11S&P computes control blocks as those shares that are a) held by another corporation; b) shares held by 
government entities; c) shares held by current and former officers, directors, founders or family trusts 
thereof; and d) shares held by trusts, pension funds, and employee stock ownership programs controlled by 
the company. If the sum of such shares exceeds 10 percent of shares outstanding, then this sum is subtracted 
from the shares outstanding to arrive at the float-adjusted number of shares.  For a more detailed description, 
see Standard and Poor’s (2011). 
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adjusted shares rather than total shares outstanding to avoid biasing our ‘bias’ estimate, 
but as a practical matter our results are virtually the same throughout the paper if we use 
total shares outstanding as the denominator. 
 The relative portfolio weight, RPW_US, is defined as the weight of the firm in US 
investors’ Canadian portfolio compared to its weight in Canadian equity market.  Let 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆 
denote the total dollar amount invested by the US institutional investors in firm j. If there 
are N firms in the Canadian equity market, then firm j’s weight in the US investors’ 
Canadian portfolio is 𝑊𝑗
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆/ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑗=1 .  Similarly, let 𝑀𝑉𝑗  denote the market value 
of firm j. Then firm j’s weight in the Canadian market portfolio is 𝑊𝑗
𝑀 = 𝑀𝑉𝑗/ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 .  
The relative portfolio weight of firm j for US investors is thus defined as: RPW_US =  
𝑊𝑗
𝑈𝑆/ 𝑊𝑗
𝑀 . As with the PCT_US, all calculations use the float-adjusted number of shares. In 
the second part of our analysis we contrast British and French investments in Canada – for 
these measures we define PCT_UK, PCT_FRANCE, RPW_UK, and RPW_FRANCE exactly as 
described above, but substitute in the relevant country’s institutional holdings data.  
 
3.2 THE INDEPENDENT VARIABLES  
 For the first and third hypothesis our treatment variable of interest is QC, an 
indicator variable that takes the value of one for firms headquartered in Quebec and the 
value zero for firms headquartered in the ROC (as given by COMPUSTAT). For the second 
hypothesis the treatment variable is FRENCHNESS, which measures a firm’s online 
presence in French versus English (as described later). 
 As discussed in the last section, we use a common set of control variables in all our 
models to capture firm characteristics that previous literature has found to influence 
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institutional investment quite apart from any foreign investor bias (precise definitions are 
given in Table 1).  Following Bradshaw et al. (2004), we control for firm SIZE, firm AGE, 
whether the firm reports US segment sales (USSEGMENT), whether the firm is cross-listed 
on a US exchange (USCROSS), the number of analysts providing forecasts (NANLST), the 
fiscal year’s sales growth (GROWTH), the return on beginning equity (ROE), the debt-to-
asset ratio (LEVERAGE), the earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the book-to-price ratio (BP), the 
dividend yield (DP), the raw stock return over the fiscal year (RRET), and whether the firm 
uses a Big 4 auditor (BIG4). All income statement variables are measured over the fiscal 
year and all balance sheet variables are measured as of the end of the fiscal year. In 
addition, because Quebec may represent a different mix of industries than the rest of 
Canada, and institutional investors may have industry preferences, all our tests include 
industry fixed effects. 
 As discussed in the literature review, USCROSS and USSEGMENT have been used in 
prior valuation studies of Quebec, and so we are careful to report their effects in all our 
tables. In addition, we include an indicator variable PROV_INCP equal to one if the firm is 
incorporated under its provincial law, and equal to zero if it is incorporated under the 
Canadian Business Corporation Act or other federal regulation; this variable has also been 
used in previous studies of Quebec.  These three variables are particularly important for 
the within-Quebec analysis (which tests hypothesis two) in order to isolate the effect of 
FRENCHNESS. Finally, we include the provincial marginal tax rate (PROV_TAX) as a proxy 
for how friendly the province is to business, and in the models that require an exclusion 
restriction, we include an indicator variable equal to one if the firm is part of the S&PTSX 
index, and equal to zero otherwise. 
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3.3 EMPIRICAL MODELS 
 Our first dependent variable, PCT_US, is a proportion, so it lies on the unit interval, 
and it has a discontinuously large mass of observations at zero. In addition, the variables 
and relative weights that cause a firm to have zero US institutional ownership might be 
different from the variables and weights that determine how much US ownership a firm 
has, given that it is greater than zero. Consequently, a simple OLS regression is not 
appropriate because, with OLS a) the predicted value from a linear relationship can extend 
infinitely beyond the unit interval, and b) the determinants that give rise to a prediction of 
zero can only be slightly different from the determinants that give rise to a small positive 
prediction. To better align our model with our data, we borrow a model that has been used 
to estimate the proportion of debt in a firm’s capital structure.12 Called the zero-inflated 
beta model, it incorporates the features above, and its application to the capital structure 
problem is found in Cook et al. (2008).13  Because this model is not commonly used, we 
provide a brief description here, and give the detailed model in Appendix 1.  We also 
supplement our analysis of PCT_US with traditional OLS regressions on the full sample and 
on the sample restricted to non-zero holdings. 
 The zero-inflated beta model produces two simultaneously-estimated results; the 
coefficients for a logit model on an indicator for whether PCT_US is zero or greater than 
zero and, for the observations where PCT_US is greater than zero, coefficients for a model 
of the level of PCT_US, where the percent is estimated as the mean parameter in a beta 
                                                        
12 Note that the capital structure problem also models a proportion, has a large mass of observations at zero, 
and there is reason to believe that what causes a firm to have zero leverage might be different from what 
determines how levered a firm is once the value is greater than zero. 
13 There is a rich statistics literature on the issue of proportions with a mass at zero.  See Kieschnick and 
McCullough (2003), and Ferrari and Cribari-Neto (2004) for solutions to the distributional issues and 
Heckman (1979) for a discussion of the selection issue that distinguishes the zero observations from the 
positive ones. 
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distribution (noting that the beta distribution is on the unit interval). To parallel the 
Heckman model that follows, we label the logit model as the ‘selection model’ and the beta 
model as the ‘final model.’ The estimation is performed using the ZOIB module in STATA, 
which allows for fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Finally, for some specifications 
we limit the data to the observations with positive PCT_US and, for these models, we 
estimate a simple beta model, which retains the property of being constrained on the (0,1) 
interval but without the selection portion of the zero-inflated beta model. 
 Our second dependent variable, RPW_US, has the same selection issue as PCT_US in 
that it also has a mass of observations at zero that are unlikely to have arrived there 
randomly, but it isn’t constrained to the unit interval. Therefore, for this dependent 
variable we estimate a Heckman two-stage model, where the first stage is a probit model 
on an indicator for whether RPW_US is zero or greater than zero and the second stage is an 
OLS regression that includes the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage.  We also 
supplement our analysis of this variable with traditional OLS regressions.  
 Both the zero-inflated beta model and the two-stage Heckman model are much 
improved if an exclusion restriction is included in the first-stage selection model; this 
lowers the potential correlation between the errors in the selection model and the errors in 
the final model.  We use an indicator for inclusion in the Standard and Poor’s TSX index as 
our exclusion variable (S&PTSX), reasoning that it will have a much greater impact on 
whether or not US institutional investors have non-zero holdings of the firm than on the 
level of investment, given that investment is positive.  
 To summarize, both the zero-inflated beta model and the two-stage Heckman model 
consist of a selection model and a final model.  All the control variables described above are 
in both the selection and final models, along with industry and year fixed effects. In 
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addition, the S&PTSX indicator variable is in the selection models but not in the final 
models, and the inverse Mills ratio from the first stage is in the final stage of the Heckman 
model.  When the sample is all Canadian firms, the treatment variable of interest is the 
indicator for a Quebec firm (QC); if there is an additional bias against Quebec firms over 
ROC firms, then the coefficient on QC will be positive in the selection model (indicating that 
zero holdings are more likely), and negative in the final model (indicating that holdings are 
lower for Quebec firms than ROC firms).   
 We compute standard errors clustered at the year and industry level, allowing for 
correlation in residuals within years and industries.  Note that this is considerably more 
conservative than clusters at the firm and year level.  Finally, although we typically have 
directional hypotheses, we report p-values for two-tailed tests. 
 
3.4 THE SAMPLE  
We begin by identifying all firms headquartered in Canada and listed on the Toronto 
Stock Exchange (COMPUSTAT EXCHG=7) between the years 2000 and 2012, resulting in an 
potential sample of 13,673 firm-years, representing 2094 unique firms, of which 233 are 
located in Quebec.  After requiring that the firm-years in our sample have the necessary 
data to construct our independent variables we have 9495 firm-years, and after removing 
companies with a stock price less than $1.00 we have 8089 firm-years, with 1249 firm-
years in Quebec and 6840 firm-years in the ROC.   
We collect institutional holding information from the Thomson Financial Service 
database available from WRDS.  For US institutional holdings, we use the S34 file 
(previously known as the Spectrum database).  The S34 file is based on the 13-f quarterly 
holdings information filed by Investment Companies with the SEC.  Rule 13(f) requires 
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institutions managing more than $100 million in equity to report their investment 
positions in all the “Section 13(f) securities” with holdings greater than 10,000 shares or 
$200,000 in market value.  Section 13(f) securities include all exchange-traded securities, 
including exchange-traded foreign company securities.  It is also common for US 
institutional investors to voluntarily report holdings for firms not traded on US exchanges; 
roughly one third of our Canadian firm-years held by US investors fall into this category.  
The voluntary nature of this data would only bias our results if US institutional investors 
systematically reported Quebec firm ownership differently than ROC firm ownership. 
Intersecting the Canadian firm sample with the US institutional holdings yields a sample of 
2956 firm-years with positive US institutional holdings, although we retain the zero 
holding observations for most of our tests.  
For British and French institutional ownership data in Canada, we rely on the 
Thomson Financial Services S12 file, which reports holdings of mutual funds.14 The source 
data for this file is primarily the semi-annual SEC N-30D and N-30Q filings that contain 
reports to shareholders of the mutual fund.  Thomson also contacts mutual funds directly 
to update their data. The S12 file contains data for the 3000 largest global funds that have 
any holdings in US exchange-traded or Canadian exchange-traded firms. Intersecting this 
institutional holding data with the Canadian firm sample results in a British investor 
sample of 2778 firm-years with non-zero holdings and a French sample of 1462 firm-years 
with non-zero holdings (as described in Table 8 and discussed later). 
 
                                                        
14 Because mutual funds are just one type of investment company (bank trusts, for example, are another type 
of investment company), the S12 file is not directly comparable to the S34 file.  Further, the holdings reported 
in the S34 file are aggregated across all funds under a manager that may be individually reported in the S12 
file. 
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4. Results 
4.1 US INSTITIONAL INVESTOR BIA AGAINST QUEBEC VERSUS THE REST OF CANADA 
Table 2 panel A describes the full Canadian firm sample and panel B describes the 
subsample with non-zero US institutional investor holdings. Initial evidence of the US 
investor bias against Quebec is seen in the first row of both panels.15  For the full sample, 
the mean PCT_US is 3.9 percent for Quebec firms and 5.2 percent for ROC firms; for the 
subsample with non-zero holdings, the mean US ownership is 11.8 percent for Quebec 
firms and 13.9 percent for ROC firms.  The comparison is relatively more extreme for 
medians; for the non-zero holding sample the median ownership is 2.3 percent for Quebec 
firms and, at 4.7 percent, is more than double for ROC firms.  The second row of each panel 
shows that, for RPW_US, the pattern across Quebec and the ROC is the same, although the 
differences in means are not significant. Table 2 panel B shows a suggestive pattern in the 
distribution of relative portfolio weights in the sample of firms with positive values.  The 
median RPW_US for the Quebec firms is 0.572, implying that, relative to their weight in the 
Canadian market, Quebec firms are under-weighted by almost 50 percent in US 
institutional investors’ Canadian portfolios.  In contrast, the median ROC firm has a relative 
portfolio weight of 1.269, implying that it is over-weighted by almost 27 percent in US 
institutional investors’ Canadian portfolios.   
 Examining the control variables in panel A of Table 2, we see many firm-specific 
characteristics of Quebec firms that might deter institutional investment relative to firms in 
the ROC. Quebec firms are less likely to be cross-listed in the US, they have slower growth, 
                                                        
15 The relative sample sizes in panel A and panel B suggest that US institutional investors are more likely to 
have non-zero holdings in ROC firms than in Quebec firms; comparing across panels, 33 percent of Quebec 
firms have non-zero US investment while 37 percent of the ROC firms have non-zero US investment.   
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lower past stock returns, and are less likely to employ a BIG4 auditor. These results 
emphasize the importance of controlling for firm-specific characteristics that might impact 
foreign investor holdings quite apart from the foreign investor bias (as discussed in 
Dahlquist and Robertsson 2001).  Interestingly, many of these differences become 
insignificant once the sample is limited to only non-zero institutional holdings, as seen in 
panel B of Table 2.  This suggests that US institutional investors use these variables to 
select the subset of Canadian firms to invest in, and this homogenizes the sample of non-
zero holdings to some degree.  Notably, there is no significant difference in the mean size of 
the Quebec firm and the ROC firm, as seen in both panel A and panel B.  This is important 
because, if it was the case that Quebec firms were significantly larger than ROC firms, and if 
US institutional investors held equally-weighted as opposed to value-weighted portfolios, 
then we would observe lower percentage ownership and lower relative portfolio weights 
in Quebec firms.  
 Table 3 gives correlations between the variables in our study.  Not surprisingly, our 
two dependent variables are highly correlated.  Examining the correlations of PCT_US and 
RPW_US with the other variables in the study shows that holdings are significantly 
positively correlated with whether the firm has a US segment, whether it is cross-listed in 
the US, firm size, and the number of analysts following the firm. There are also a number of 
significant correlations between the control variables. While the control variables are not 
central to the main message of the paper, these high correlations may cause these variables 
to have unexpected signs in the multivariate models.     
 To assess the US investor’s bias against Quebec firms versus ROC firms, while 
controlling for the differences in firm characteristics, we estimate the zero-inflated beta 
model for PCT_US and the two-stage Heckman model for RPW_US, as described above. 
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Recall that positive coefficients in the selection models indicate that it is more likely to be 
an observation with zero holdings, while a positive coefficient in the final model indicates 
that the holdings are increasing in the variable. The first two columns of Table 4 give the 
results for the zero-inflated beta model. As seen in the first column, after controlling for 
many firm-specific characteristics, the probability that PCT_US=0 is significantly higher for 
Quebec firms than for ROC firms. The significantly negative coefficient on QC in the second 
column shows that, after controlling for selection, and all the firm-specific variables, 
Quebec firms have a significantly lower percentage of shares held by US investors than ROC 
firms.  
 The coefficients in the zero-inflated beta model, once raised exponentially, are the 
odds ratio in the selection model and the proportions ratio in the final model.16 
Consequently, the 0.277 coefficient on QC in the selection model means that, after 
controlling for the other variables in the model, the odds of being in the zero-holding 
sample are 32 percent higher for a Quebec firm than for a ROC firm (exp(0.277)=1.32).  
Similarly, the -0.445 coefficient on QC in the final model means that, after controlling for 
the other variables in the model, the proportion of US investor ownership to non-US 
investor ownership is 35.9 percent lower for Quebec firms than for ROC firms (exp(-
0.445)=0.641, 0.641-1=-.359). In sum, the US institutional investor bias against Quebec 
firms causes them to invest in substantially fewer Quebec firms than ROC firms and, when 
they invest, to invest in substantially smaller fractions of Quebec firms than ROC firms. 
                                                        
16 As shown in Appendix 1, the coefficient on QC in the final stage model is 𝛽𝑄𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜇𝑄
(1−𝜇𝑄)
⁄
𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶
(1−𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶)
⁄
) , where 
Q is the estimated PCT_US for a Quebec firm and ROC is the estimated PCT_US for a ROC firm, and so the 
exponentiated value of the coefficient is the proportions ratio. 
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 The results for the two-stage Heckman model, given in the third and fourth columns 
of Table 4 mirror the results from the zero-inflated beta model.  The relative portfolio 
weight is significantly more likely to be zero for Quebec firms than for ROC firms and, when 
the weight is positive, it is significantly smaller for Quebec firms than for ROC firms.  The 
coefficient of -2.174 in the final model is economically significant as well.  In the sample 
with positive RPW_US, the relative portfolio weight for the mean Quebec firm is close to the 
mean ROC firm (7.016 and 7.664, respectively, as seen in Table 2, panel B).  However, once 
the firm-specific controls are added to the model, and the selection effect is controlled for 
with a highly significant inverse Mills ratio, the Quebec firms’ relative portfolio weights are 
2.174 lower than the ROC firms’ relative portfolio weights.  In sum, the results for RPW_US 
echo the results for PCT_US; consistent with hypothesis one, US institutional investors have 
a bias against Quebec firms that is significantly greater than the bias against ROC firms. 
 Both models in Table 4 include indicators for provincial incorporation (PROV_INCP), 
US cross-listing (USCROSS), and a US segment (USSEGMENT), as well as the provincial tax 
rate (PROV_TAX).  These variables are primarily intended as controls when we examine 
within-Quebec variation in the foreign investor bias, but we include them in the full sample 
models for completeness.  Across the full sample of Canadian firms, US institutional 
investors are more likely to hold greater percentages of US cross-listed firms and firms 
with US segments, as seen in column 2, and they are less likely to have zero holdings in 
these firms, as seen in column 1. The results for the relative portfolio weights are less clear; 
the selection model shows US cross-listed and US-segment firms are less likely to have zero 
US holdings but these variables are insignificant in the final model. Finally, column 2 shows 
that PCT_US is significantly lower for firms in provinces with higher tax rates. 
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 The other control variables behave largely as expected in the PCT_US model (not 
surprisingly because PCT_US and the control variables are both taken from Bradshaw et al. 
2004).  US investor ownership increases with firm size (SIZE), with analyst coverage 
(NANLST), and decreases with the dividend yield (DP).  Inconsistent with Bradshaw et al. 
(2004), ownership decreases with the raw stock return (RRET) and with the use of a BIG4 
auditor (BIG4).  Interestingly, these variables behave largely as expected for RPW_US in the 
first stage of the Heckman model, but are generally insignificant in the final model. Finally, 
the exclusion restriction variable, S&PTSX, is significant and negatively related to being a 
zero-holding observation, as expected. 
 Table 5 reports two different specification checks for each model.  First, it is possible 
that the negative Quebec bias is actually driven by a positive Ontario bias. The Ontario 
Securities Act has been interpreted as giving legal standing to buyers or sellers residing 
outside Ontario as long as the issuer is an Ontario firm (McCloskey 2001). Further, the 
Toronto Stock Exchange resides in Ontario, and its rules may afford investors additional 
legal protection.  Finally, Ontario is the largest Anglophone province.  If these factors cause 
US investors to have a positive bias towards Ontario firms, it may induce a negative bias 
against Quebec firms. To rule out this alternative explanation, we re-estimate our models 
after excluding Ontario firms from the sample. The results for PCT_US, given in columns 1 
and 2, show that the coefficient estimates and significance levels of QC are very similar to 
those reported for the full sample. The results for RPW_US, given in Columns 5 and 6, are 
also consistent with the results for the full sample, although the coefficient on QC gained 
some significance in the selection model but lost some significance in the final model.  
 The second specification check in Table 5 is to estimate simple OLS regressions. 
Note that there is no selection model and the predicted coefficient on QC is negative for the 
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full sample and the restricted sample of non-zero holdings.  As seen in column 3, PCT_US is 
2.7 percent lower for Quebec firms than for ROC firms in the full sample, and is 6.3 percent 
lower when the sample is restricted to those firms with non-zero holdings, as seen in 
column 4.  Finally, the results for RPW_US are given in column 7 for the full sample and in 
column 8 for the non-zero holdings sample; the coefficient on QC is significantly negative in 
both cases.  
 In terms of the other firm choices that may influence institutional investment, 
USCROSS and USSEGMENT continue to remain significant for most of the columns in Table 
5.  The simple OLS with the non-zero holding sample gives the easiest coefficients to 
interpret. In column 4 we see that cross-listing increases the percent held by 8.2 percent 
and having a US segment increases the percent held by 7.1 percent; both values are only 
slightly higher than the impact of being located in Quebec (in absolute value). In terms of 
relative portfolio weights, column 8 shows that cross-listing increases the weight in the US 
investor portfolio, relative to the firm’s weight in the country by 5.168, and having a US 
segment increases it by 4.141.  Again, these effects are only slightly more extreme than the 
effect of being located in Quebec, and help to put the bias against Quebec firms in 
perspective. 
 The most significant control variable in the selection models given in Table 4 is firm 
size.  Accordingly, in Table 6 we match on size. Matching allows a more general relation 
between size and the dependent variable than the zero-inflated beta model or two-stage 
Heckman model afford.  For each firm-year with non-zero holdings we match the Quebec 
firm with the closest firm in the ROC in terms of its market value; the resulting sample has 
416 observations from Quebec and 416 observations from the ROC.  As seen in the table, 
the coefficient for QC is -0.596, somewhat more negative than the comparable coefficient in 
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column 2 of Table 4 or column 2 of Table 5.  The magnitude of this result is striking – a firm 
in Quebec has a proportion of US ownership to non-US ownership that is 45 percent lower 
than the size-matched firm in the ROC (exp(-0.596) = 0.55, 0.55-1 = 0.45).  For the RPW_US, 
the coefficient on QC is -3.879, roughly 78 percent more negative than the comparable 
coefficient in column 4 of Table 4; the portfolio weight US institutional investors put on 
Quebec firms, relative to their weight in the Canadian market, is 3.879 lower than the 
relative weight they place on a size-matched firm in the ROC. 
 In sum, US institutional investors exhibit a significant bias against firms located in 
Quebec relative to the ROC, consistent with the first hypothesis. Despite the similarities in 
physical distance to the US, the bilingual publication of important disclosure documents, 
and the same accounting rules across Canadian provinces, US investors view Quebec firms 
less favourably than ROC firms, both in terms of the percent of shares they hold and in the 
relative weight they place on the firm in their Canadian portfolio.  Further, the results do 
not appear to be driven by differences in investor protection, insofar as controlling for 
provincial incorporation, US cross-listing, and removing Ontario from the sample, did not 
change the results.  
 
4.2 DOES THE INVESTOR BIAS AGAINST QUEBEC HAVE A BASIS IN LANGUAGE?  
 
 We have documented a large US investor bias against Quebec firms relative to ROC 
firms.  In this section we ask if any part of the US investor bias against Quebec firms is due 
to the use of the French language in Quebec.  We approach this problem by 1) examining 
the impact of variation in Quebec firms’ French internet presence on the US investor bias, 
and 2) by contrasting the bias of British investors and French investors.   
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 To measure variation in language at the firm level we create a measure of a firm’s 
French language online presence, labeled FRENCHNESS.  We construct this measure by 
counting the number of French and English documents that result from an Advanced 
Google search of the company’s name during each fiscal year: FRENCHNESS is the ratio of 
French documents to the sum of French and English documents.  FRENCHNESS is a proxy 
for the relative gross information production about the firm in each language.  We make no 
effort to eliminate redundant documents in the count, reasoning that they represent the 
redistribution of information to different audiences.  To control for the total amount of 
information production, we also create the variable WEB as the log of one plus the total 
number of documents in both languages (i.e. the log of the denominator of FRENCHNESS).  
While the idea behind FRENCHNESS is relatively easy to describe, the actual Advanced 
Google search process is complicated, and is described in Appendix 2.  We begin with the 
sample of 416 Quebec firm-years with non-zero US holdings, but eliminate 30 firm-years 
because our search results did not yield any documents that could clearly be associated 
with a specific year.  The result is a sample of 386 Quebec firm-years. The median value for 
FRENCHNESS is 0.259, and it ranges from 0 to 0.670 (untabulated).   
 Table 7 divides the Quebec firm sample by FRENCHESS above and below the median 
and gives descriptive statistics for each group. The third row in the table shows that US 
investor’s hold 7.4 percent of the float in high FRENCHNESS firms and 13.4 percent of the 
float for low FRENCHNESS firms, on average, and the difference is significant. The relative 
portfolio weight is also lower in high FRENCHNESS firms, although the difference is not 
significant. Table 7 also shows other important differences between high and low 
FRENCHNESS firms. The frequency of provincial incorporation (in this case, the Quebec 
Company Act) is significantly higher for high FRENCHNESS firms, and the frequency of US 
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cross-listing is significantly lower. Because these factors can influence US institutional 
investor holdings, but are unrelated to language, they will need to be controlled in the 
multivariate models. Finally, there is no significant difference in the sizes of firms with high 
or low FRENCHNESS. 
 Table 8 fits a beta model for PCT_US and an OLS model for RPW_US for the non-zero 
US investor holdings of Quebec firms (because we begin with the non-zero holdings, we do 
not need a first-stage selection model).  The first row of the table shows that US holdings 
are significantly negatively related to a Quebec firm’s FRENCHESS.  The coefficient of -0.671 
in the PCT_US implies that the ratio of US investor holdings to non-US investor holdings is 
4.9 percent lower for a 10 percent increase in FRENCHNESS (exp(-0.671)=.51, .51-1=.49, 
times a treatment effect of .10 = 4.9 percent).  The coefficient of -7.911 in the RPW_US 
model is also impressive, given that the mean of RPW_US is 5.471 for low FRENCHNESS 
firm-years and 6.432 for high FRENCHNESS firms.  A 10 percent increase in FRENCHNESS is 
associated with a 79.11 percent reduction in the relative portfolio weight in the US 
investor’s Quebec portfolio. Of the other firm choice variables that vary within Quebec, 
PROV_INCP, USCROSS, and USSEGMENT, only cross-listing is significant. In sum, after 
controlling for all the firm-level characteristics, the degree of FRENCHNESS displayed by a 
Quebec firm has a significant influence on its US institutional investor holdings.  These 
results are consistent with our second hypothesis. 
 Our second approach to identifying the language/culture contribution to the foreign 
investor bias is to contrast the holdings of British and French institutional investors.  As 
discussed in the last section, this treatment provides a high contrast in the alignment of 
language between the investor and the Quebec firm, significantly increases the geodesic 
distance from Canada, but keeps the distance from Canada approximately equal for the two 
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investor locations.17 We caution, however, that the data on institutional holdings of British 
and French investors is not nearly as complete the US institutional holdings data; 
consequently, the overall level of investment is likely to be understated.  
 Table 9 gives descriptive statistics for the samples that intersect Canadian firms 
with institutional investors from the UK (panel A) and from France (panel B); we only 
tabulate these statistics for the non-zero holdings sample but include the zero holdings 
data in all the models that follow.  Because institutional investors are much larger in the UK 
than in France, it isn’t surprising that the British hold more of the float in both Quebec 
firms and ROC firms than the French do, as seen by comparing the first row in each panel. 
However, our hypothesis is that the relative bias will be smaller in France than the UK, as is 
indeed the case.  To see this, compare the difference in British and French holdings in 
Quebec (PCT_UK-PCT_FRANCE = 0.67 percent -0.14 percent = 0.53 percent) with the 
difference in their holdings in the ROC (PCT_UK-PCT_FRANCE = 1.21 percent –0.27 percent 
= 0.94 percent); the French are much closer to the British in their holdings of Quebec firms 
than in their holdings of ROC firms.  Interestingly, the relative portfolio weights of French 
investors are greater than the weights of British investors in both Quebec and the ROC – 
basically, French investors place smaller but more concentrated bets in Canada.  More 
importantly, the difference in the relative portfolio weights is greater in Quebec (RPW_UK – 
RPW_FR = 11.372-18.739 = -7.367) than it is in the ROC (RPW_UK – RPW_FR = 25.335 – 
27.135 = -1.800).  While French investors place only slightly larger weights on ROC firms 
                                                        
17 Obviously investors in France and the UK differ greatly in their use and understanding of the French 
language.  But, as we have discussed, language is tied up with culture.  Using the four Hofstede measures of 
culture once again, the Euclidian distance between France and Quebec is 30 while the distance between the 
UK and Quebec is 41.  
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than British investors, they place substantially larger weights on Quebec firms than British 
investors do. 
 The other differences in firm characteristics between Quebec and the ROC have 
similar patterns across the two panels of Table 9. In both samples, the firms in Quebec are 
more likely to have a European segment (EUSEGMENT), have a lower provincial tax rate 
(PROV_TAX), and are less likely to be incorporated under provincial law (PROV_INCP), all of 
which should lead to greater institutional ownership.  Working against this, however, is the 
fact that in both samples, firms in Quebec are less likely to be cross-listed on a European 
exchange (EUCROSS). 
 To compare the relative bias against Quebec between the two investor groups, we 
begin with the full sample of 8089 Canadian firms-years, of which 2900 firm-years have 
non-zero holdings from either British or French investors.  We then subtract the French 
value from the British value to create two new dependent variables, PCTDIF = PCT_UK – 
PCT_FR, and RPWDIF = RPW_UK – RPW_FR.  
 Our first model recognizes that, because the majority of observations are zero (both 
the British and French values are zero), we again have a selection problem. To control for 
this we estimate a two-stage Heckman model, where the first stage uses EUCROSS and 
EUSEGMENT in addition to the same set of variables that were in the first stage models 
given for PCT_US and RPW_US in columns 1 and 3, respectively, in Table 4. The first stage 
uses the full sample of 8089 observations. For brevity, we only report the final stage model 
results in Table 10.  As seen in column 1, the coefficient on QC is significantly negative; the 
difference between the percent of float held by British investors and French investors is 
smaller for Quebec firms than ROC firms. As a robustness test we also estimate OLS 
regressions on the full sample of firms, and on the subsample of non-zero holdings.  The 
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treatment variable QC is again significantly negative in both regressions, as seen in columns 
2 and 3.  Columns 5, 6, and 7 repeat the above analysis using the difference in relative 
portfolio weights between the two groups of investors (RPWDIF).  In all specifications the 
coefficient on QC is significantly negative, implying that British investors have a bigger bias 
against Quebec firms relative to ROC firms than French investors.  
 The final analysis in Table 10 takes a different approach to comparing the relative 
investor biases between British and French investors. PCTDIF and RPWDIF show the 
difference between French and British investors’ response to Quebec firms and ROC firms, 
but they don’t reveal the level of each groups’ bias against each firm location.  To 
investigate this issue, rather than taking the difference in their percentage holdings or 
relative portfolio weights, we use the original dependent variables PCT_UK, PCT_FRANCE, 
RPW_UK and RPW_FRANCE and stack all observations with non-zero holdings from either 
British or French investors.  In effect, one observation in this analysis is a firm-year-
investor location. We then use an indicator variable FRANCE to identify the investor 
location (FRANCE equals one when the investor is in France and equals zero when the 
investor is in the UK). Thus, different combinations of QC and FRANCE pick out the values 
for different firm locations and investor locations while controlling for all the previously 
discussed variables. Examining the first row of columns 4 and 8 in Table 10 shows the 
generic bias against Quebec; the coefficient on QC is significantly negative in both 
regressions. Of more interest, however, is the coefficient on the interaction between QC and 
FRANCE; in both models the interaction is significantly positive. Controlling for the generic 
bias against Quebec (QC) and for any difference in the Canada-wide level of investment by 
each investor location (FRANCE), French investors hold significantly more of the float and 
place larger portfolio weights on Quebec firms than ROC firms (QC*FRANCE). 
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 To illustrate the results for the stacked regressions in columns 4 and 8 of Table 10, 
consider the estimated effects for different combinations of investor and firm locations.  
Beginning with the values for percent holdings in column 4, label the estimated British 
holdings in ROC firms (FRANCE=0 and QC=0) as INTCP (basically the sum of the intercept 
and all the fixed effects). The estimated British holdings in Quebec firms (FRANCE=0 and 
QC=1) is then INTCP-0.003; British investors have a bigger bias against Quebec firms than 
against ROC firms. Similarly, the estimated French holdings in ROC firms is INTCP -0.010 
(FRANCE=1 and QC=0), and the estimated French holdings in Quebec firms is INTCP-0.003-
0.010+0.005=INTCP-0.008 (FRANCE=1 and QC=1). Thus, French investors have a smaller 
bias against Quebec firms than against ROC firms.  The same exercise for relative portfolio 
weights using the estimates from column 8 gives similar results. British investors have a 
bigger bias against Quebec firms than ROC firms, and French investors have a bigger bias 
against ROC firms than Quebec firms. 
 In sum, comparing the behaviour of British and French investors offers a good 
contrast in the alignment of language between the investor and the firm while greatly 
increasing the distance from Canada, and yet holding it roughly equal between investor 
groups.  It also holds constant Quebec-specific forces, such as political risk or poor investor 
protection.  We find that French investors have a significantly smaller bias than British 
investors against Quebec firms relative to ROC firms.  These results are consistent with our 
third hypothesis. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 In the search for the root cause of the foreign investor bias against domestic firms, 
our results indicate that foreign investors are sensitive to differences between their 
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domestic language and the language used in the location of a foreign investment. This bias 
has a significant impact on firms in Quebec. US institutional investors invest significantly 
less in Quebec firms than in firms located elsewhere in Canada, and at a rate that varies 
significantly with the “Frenchness” of the Quebec firm. We also find that French investors 
are significantly less biased against Quebec firms than are British investors, adding further 
evidence to the hypothesis that linguistic differences contribute significantly to the foreign 
investor bias. 
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Appendix 1 
 
 This appendix borrows heavily from Cook et al. (2008) and the references therein. 
The zero-inflated beta model assumes the following density for the proportion yi of foreign 
ownership: 
 
𝑔(𝑦𝑖; 𝛿, 𝜇, 𝜙)  = {
𝛿 𝑖𝑓 𝑦𝑖 = 0
(1 − 𝛿)𝑓(𝑦𝑖; 𝜇, 𝜙) 𝑖𝑓 0 < 𝑦𝑖 < 1
      (A1) 
 
 
where 𝑓(𝑦𝑖; 𝜇, 𝜙)is a beta density defined on 0<yi<1 , given as
 
𝑓(𝑦𝑖; 𝑢, 𝜙) =
Γ(𝜙)
Γ(𝜇𝜙)Γ((1−𝜇)𝜙)
𝑦𝑖
𝜇𝜙−1(1 − 𝑦𝑖)
(1−𝜇)𝜙−1.    (A2) 
 
where 0<<1 and >0;  is the location parameter, with E(yi)= and  is the precision 
parameter, with V(yi) = 
𝜇(1−𝜇)
𝜙+1
 .  Thus, for the density g,  
 
E(yi) = (1-) and V(yi) = (1 − 𝛿)
𝜇(1−𝜇)
𝜙+1
+ 𝛿(1 − 𝛿)𝜇2.     
 
The expression for E(yi) illustrates how failing to account for the mass of observations at 
zero will lead to overstated estimates of the proportion.  The expression for V(yi) illustrates 
that the variance increases with the mean, a distributional feature that the OLS model 
cannot accommodate.  The advantage of assuming the dependent variable has this density 
is that it allows an arbitrarily large mass point at zero through the parameter , and is has a 
very flexible shape for values greater than zero as determined by the u and  parameters.  
For instance, the beta density can be uniform ( = ½, = 1), can descend monotonically 
over the interval (e.g. =1/4,  = 4), or be single-peaked (e.g. =1/2, =4).18 
 Next we need to describe how the independent variables map into the dependent 
variable. There are two parts to this. First, to estimate whether yi=0 or yi>0 the model 
assumes a cumulative logistic function mapping the data vector Xi with weight parameters 
A into the probability of yi = 0, as 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑦𝑖 = 0) = 𝛿 =
𝑒𝑋𝑖
′𝐴
1+𝑒𝑋𝑖
′𝐴
 .        (A3) 
 
If yi>0 the model maps the data vector Zi with coefficient weights B to the conditional mean 
parameter ui , as  
 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖|𝑦𝑖 > 0) = 𝜇𝑖 =
𝑒𝑍𝑖
′𝐵
1+𝑒𝑍𝑖
′𝐵
 .        (A4) 
                                                        
18 One may be tempted to use a Tobit model to handle the mass of zeros.  However, the Tobit model is 
designed for cases where the data is censored at zero; that is, the true value is negative but the research only 
observes these values as being censored to zero. That is not the case for proportions. See Madalla (1991) for 
an extended discussion of this issue.   
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Importantly, note that the two parts of the model can be estimated on different 
independent variable vectors Xi and Zi, and even if Xi = Zi, as will be the case in our analysis, 
the model allows different estimated weights A and B.  
 The data vectors Xi and Zi and weight vectors A and B combine to determine i and  
in the density of yi given above.  The maximum likelihood estimates of A and B are those 
that maximize the joint density of the sample (yi, Xi, Zi).  The estimation is performed using 
the ZOIB module in STATA, which allows for fixed effects and clustered standard errors. 
 As with any logistic function, the exponentiated coefficients from A3 are odds ratios; 
similarly, the exponentiated coefficients from A4 are ratios of proportions.  That is,  
 
𝑒𝑍𝑖
′𝐵 =
𝜇𝑖
1−𝜇𝑖
.          (A5) 
 
In the context of this study, denote the coefficient on the indicator variable QC as 𝛽𝑄𝐶 and 
rewrite the LHS of A5 as 𝑒𝛽𝑄𝐶𝑒𝑍𝑖
′𝐵 when QC=1 (the firm is in Quebec) and 𝑒𝑍𝑖
′𝐵 when QC=0 
(the firm is in the Rest of Canada).  Taking the ratio gives  
 
𝑒𝛽𝑄𝐶 =
𝜇𝑄
(1−𝜇𝑄)
⁄
𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶
(1−𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶)
⁄
, or equivalently 𝛽𝑄𝐶 = 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝜇𝑄
(1−𝜇𝑄)
⁄
𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶
(1−𝜇𝑅𝑂𝐶)
⁄
), 
 
where the subscript on  indicates whether the firm is in Quebec (Q) or the Rest of Canada 
(ROC).  As an example, in Table 4, column 2, the coefficient on QC is -0.445, and so the 
exponentiated value is 0.641.  This means that, after controlling for the other variables in 
the model, the ratio of US investor ownership to non-US investor ownership is 35.9 percent 
lower for Quebec firms than for ROC firms. 
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Appendix 2 
 
 We use Advanced Google Search to construct both WEB and FRENCHNESS for our 
sample of Quebec firm-years. In the search we stipulate that the source documents be a) 
from Canada, b) in the year that corresponds to the firm’s fiscal year, c) in the French 
language, and then separately, in the English language. The search string is for the exact 
string of the company’s name.  We first investigate how the company’s name appears on 
the company website and in popular news sources to develop a suitable search string 
(often ending with the suffix ‘Inc.’).  We require that the search string yields the company 
website in the first page of the search results, and manually check that the search results 
indeed correspond to the company.  Once the correct search string for a company is found, 
we identify the documents generated about the company in each language for each fiscal 
year. If a company changes its name over the sample period, we make appropriate changes 
in the search string so that we use the correct name when searching for documents in prior 
fiscal years. The results are then manually checked to eliminate matches that do not 
correspond to the firm (typically occurring on the last few pages of the search). All 
redundant documents are counted, reasoning that these represent rebroadcasting of 
information to different audiences. 
A minor problem with replicability occurs because the Google search algorithm is 
dynamic, and proprietary. To limit this problem, the search was conducted on a computer 
with all browser data erased after each search, and the location of the user blocked.  All 
searches were performed in the month of November, 2012, but the same procedure 
conducted at a later point in time may yield slightly different results.  The results for our 
sample are available on request. 
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Table 1 
Variable Definitions 
 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables 
PCT_US percentage ownership by U.S. institutional investors in the firm from Thomson 
Reuters Institutional Holdings S34 file (the 13f  data), defined as total number 
of shares owned by U.S. institutions divided by the float, which is shares 
outstanding less the number of shares held by block holders, at the end of the 
fiscal year 
RPW_US US investor relative portfolio weight is the weight of the firm in US investor’s 
Canadian portfolio compared to its weight in Canadian equity market.  
Let 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆 = total dollar amount invested by the US institutional investors in 
firm j. If there are N firms in the Canadian equity market, then firm j’s weight in 
US investors’ Canadian portfolio, 𝑊𝑗
𝑈𝑆 = 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆/ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑈𝑆𝑁
𝑗=1 .  Similarly, let 𝑀𝑉𝑗  
denote the market value of firm j.  Then firm j’s weight in the Canadian market 
portfolio, 𝑊𝑗
𝑀 = 𝑀𝑉𝑗/ ∑ 𝑀𝑉𝑗
𝑁
𝑗=1 .  The relative portfolio weight of firm ‘j’ among 
US investors is defined as: 𝑊𝑗
𝑈𝑆/ 𝑊𝑗
𝑀 .   
PCTDIF  
 
differential ownership by the U.K. mutual funds and the French mutual funds 
for a given firm-year, defined as PCT_UK minus PCT_FRANCE, where PCT_UK 
and PCT_FRANCE are constructed in the same way as PCT_US described above.  
For British and French holdings, data is available only for mutual funds, and it 
comes from Thomson Reuters mutual fund database (i.e. the S12 file). 
RPWDIF differential relative portfolio weight by the UK mutual funds and the French 
mutual funds for a given firm-year, defined as RPW_ UK minus RPW_FRANCE, 
where RPW_UK and RPW_FRANCE are constructed in the same way as RPW_US 
described above.  For British and French holdings, data is available only for 
mutual funds, and it comes from Thomson Reuters mutual fund database (i.e. 
the S12 file). 
Variables for Canada-wide Analysis 
QC indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is headquartered in the Province of 
Quebec [LOC=Canada and STATE=Quebec] and 0 if the firm is headquartered in 
another Canadian province. 
S&PTSX indicator variable equal to 1 if a firm is included in the S&PTSX (previously 
known as TSX300) index in given year, and 0 otherwise. 
USCROSS indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s equity is traded in a major U.S. 
exchange or over-the-counter bulletin board in a given year as recorded in the 
CRSP-COMPUSTAT merged database, and 0 otherwise. 
USSEGMENT indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses U.S. segment sales in 
COMPUSTAT Historical Segment data, and 0 otherwise. 
PROV_INCP indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm is incorporated under the provincial 
incorporation act, and 0 if the firm is incorporated under the Canadian Business 
Corporation Act or another national regulatory regime. 
PROVTAX provincial marginal tax rate of the province where the firm is headquartered in 
a given year. 
SIZE the logarithm of the market value of equity at the end of the fiscal year : 
[Log(CSHO*PRCC_F)].  Reported unlogged in descriptive tables 2 and 7. 
AGE firm age, defined as log of one plus the number of years since a firm’s first 
appearance in COMPUSTAT fundamental file. Reported unlogged in descriptive 
tables 2 and 7. 
GROWTH the one-year growth in net sales: [SALE/lag(SALE)-1] 
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ROE  return on equity, calculated as (net income after preferred dividends 
/beginning common equity): [(NI-DVP)/lag(CEQ)] 
LEVERAGE the debt-to-total assets ratio, calculated as [(long-term debt + debt in current 
liabilities)/total asset] : [(DLTT+DLC)/AT] 
EP earnings-to-price ratio, calculated as (earnings per share/year-end market 
price): [EPSPX/PRCC_F] 
BP book-to-market ratio, calculated as (book value per share/year-end market 
price): 
[(CEQ/CSHO)/PRCC_F] 
DP dividend yield, calculated as (dividends per share/year-end market price): 
[DVPSP_F/ PRCC_F] 
RRET one year raw stock return over fiscal year 
NANLSYT log of one plus the number of analysts providing earnings forecasts during the 
last month of the fiscal year from I/B/E/S Summary History data. Reported 
unlogged in descriptive tables 2 and 7. 
BIG4 an indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s auditor is one of the Big 4 auditors 
Additional Variables for within-Quebec Analysis 
FRENCHNESS degree of usage of French language in the web presence of the firm in a given 
year, defined as the number of online French language documents generated 
within Canada divided by the total number of online documents (English and 
French language) generated within Canada about the firm during the fiscal year.  
See Appendix 2 for details. 
WEB the size of web presence of a firm in a given year, defined as log of one plus the 
total number of online documents (English and French language) generated 
within Canada about the firm during the fiscal year 
Additional Variables for European Investor Ownership Analysis 
EUCROSS indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm’s security is traded on a French, British, 
or other European stock exchanges in a given year as recorded in CAPITAL IQ, 
and 0 otherwise 
EUSEGMENT indicator variable equal to 1 if the firm discloses segment sales in France, the 
United Kingdom, or other European countries/ regions in a given year as 
recorded in COMPUSTAT Historical Segment data, and 0 otherwise.  
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Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics: US Institutional holdings of Canadian firms 
               
Panel A.  Full sample          
               
 Quebec  Rest of Canada  Difference 
 Count Mean P25 Median P75  Count Mean P25 Median P75  in Mean 
PCT_US 1249 0.039 0.000 0.000 0.003  6840 0.052 0.000 0.000 0.007  -0.012 ** 
RPW_US 1249 2.337 0.000 0.000 0.056  6840 2.846 0.000 0.000 0.268  -0.509  
USSEGMENT 1249 0.144 0.000 0.000 0.000  6840 0.135 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.009  
PROV_TAX 1249 0.101 0.089 0.090 0.119  6840 0.116 0.100 0.118 0.120  -0.016 *** 
PROV_INCP 1249 0.364 0.000 0.000 1.000  6840 0.672 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.308 *** 
AGE 1249 14.2 6.0 11.0 19.0  6840 12.6 5.0 9.0 16.0  1.6 *** 
USCROSS 1249 0.300 0.000 0.000 1.000  6840 0.352 0.000 0.000 1.000  -0.052 *** 
SIZE 1249 1852.8 82.2 284.0 1145.2  6840 1772.5 75.9 263.2 1014.8  80.3  
GROWTH 1249 0.193 -0.019 0.070 0.190  6840 0.342 -0.027 0.107 0.342  -0.149 *** 
ROE 1249 0.055 0.003 0.110 0.179  6840 0.071 -0.012 0.091 0.186  -0.016  
LEVERAGE 1249 0.202 0.040 0.179 0.320  6840 0.214 0.033 0.181 0.328  -0.012 * 
EP 1249 0.001 0.002 0.056 0.085  6840 0.005 -0.008 0.046 0.084  -0.004  
BP 1249 0.763 0.401 0.612 0.973  6840 0.727 0.373 0.603 0.956  0.036 * 
DP 1249 0.022 0.000 0.008 0.024  6840 0.032 0.000 0.005 0.044  -0.011 *** 
RRET 1249 0.159 -0.167 0.081 0.334  6840 0.225 -0.150 0.116 0.412  -0.066 *** 
NANALYST 1249 0.582 0.000 0.000 0.000  6840 0.463 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.119 * 
BIG4 1249 0.839 1.000 1.000 1.000  6840 0.932 1.000 1.000 1.000  -0.093 *** 
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Table 2 (Continued) 
Descriptive Statistics: US Institutional holdings of Canadian firms 
               
Panel B.  Only firm-years with non-zero holdings       
               
 Quebec  Rest of Canada  Difference 
 Count Mean P25 Median P75  Count Mean P25 Median P75  in Mean 
PCT_US 416 0.118 0.003 0.023 0.186  2540 0.139 0.003 0.047 0.223  -0.021 * 
RPW_US 416 7.016 0.056 0.572 4.933  2540 7.664 0.107 1.269 9.939  -0.648  
USSEGMENT 416 0.389 0.000 0.000 1.000  2540 0.285 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.104 *** 
PROV_TAX 416 0.101 0.090 0.099 0.119  2540 0.115 0.100 0.118 0.120  -0.014 *** 
PROV_INCP 416 0.334 0.000 0.000 1.000  2540 0.596 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.262 *** 
AGE 416 20.0 9.0 16.0 27.0  2540 15.7 7.0 11.0 21.0  4.3 *** 
USCROSS 416 0.596 0.000 1.000 1.000  2540 0.640 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.044  
SIZE 416 4384.4 275.0 1219.0 4007.0  2540 3761.4 241.9 815.5 3023.7  623.0  
GROWTH 416 0.166 -0.019 0.071 0.185  2540 0.373 -0.013 0.125 0.377  -0.207 *** 
ROE 416 0.070 0.011 0.122 0.194  2540 0.063 -0.022 0.089 0.184  0.007  
LEVERAGE 416 0.227 0.087 0.215 0.342  2540 0.201 0.036 0.168 0.308  0.026 ** 
EP 416 -0.004 0.009 0.052 0.078  2540 -0.001 -0.013 0.036 0.070  -0.004  
BP 416 0.644 0.352 0.525 0.786  2540 0.604 0.325 0.498 0.752  0.040  
DP 416 0.017 0.000 0.009 0.024  2540 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.022  -0.001  
RRET 416 0.165 -0.143 0.089 0.329  2540 0.225 -0.162 0.111 0.409  -0.060  
NANALYST 416 1.683 0.000 0.000 1.000  2540 1.219 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.463 ** 
BIG4 416 0.841 1.000 1.000 1.000  2540 0.954 1.000 1.000 1.000  -0.113 *** 
 
Note: variable definitions are given in Table 1.  AGE, SIZE, and NANALYST are logged in the analysis but are reported here unlogged 
to aid in their interpretation.
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Table 3 
Correlations Table: US Institutional holdings of Canadian firms (Full Sample) 
Spearman Correlations above the diagonal and Pearson Correlations below the diagonal (p-values reported in italic) 
 
PCT_ 
US RPW_US QC 
US 
SEGMENT 
PROV_ 
TAX 
PROV_ 
INCP AGE 
US 
CROSS SIZE GROWTH ROE LEV EP BP DP RRET 
N 
ANALYST BIG4 
                   
PCT_US 1 0.872 -0.037 0.463 0.020 -0.163 0.200 0.521 0.227 0.001 -0.001 0.012 -0.049 -0.100 -0.136 -0.058 0.463 0.045 
 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.28 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 0.96 0.53 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 
RPW_US 0.415 1 0.009 0.406 0.007 -0.252 0.356 0.488 0.589 0.007 0.169 0.081 0.118 -0.164 0.100 0.027 0.419 0.114 
 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.00 0.00 
QC -0.041 0.014 1 0.079 -0.386 -0.184 0.121 -0.032 0.056 -0.090 0.045 0.072 0.069 0.029 0.059 -0.015 0.026 -0.163 
 0.03 0.46 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.43 0.16 0.00 
USSEGMENT 0.471 0.216 0.079 1 0.007 -0.237 0.213 0.489 0.095 -0.068 -0.085 0.050 -0.090 -0.053 -0.095 -0.059 0.254 0.006 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.72 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.75 
PROV_TAX -0.034 -0.059 -0.306 0.028 1 0.052 -0.100 -0.052 -0.157 0.074 -0.035 -0.054 -0.042 -0.069 -0.104 0.042 -0.142 0.031 
 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.10 
PROV_INCP -0.174 -0.215 -0.184 -0.237 0.045 1 -0.300 -0.201 -0.258 0.115 -0.095 -0.047 -0.093 0.072 -0.097 0.018 -0.184 -0.075 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.33 0.00 0.00 
AGE 0.198 0.327 0.120 0.215 -0.101 -0.301 1 0.266 0.498 -0.230 0.186 0.173 0.226 0.021 0.290 -0.039 0.159 0.142 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.24 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.00 
USCROSS 0.473 0.302 -0.032 0.489 -0.025 -0.201 0.274 1 0.199 -0.084 -0.072 0.013 -0.066 -0.035 -0.067 -0.102 0.380 0.041 
 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 0.17 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.48 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 
SIZE 0.248 0.560 0.054 0.087 -0.161 -0.270 0.494 0.204 1 -0.009 0.373 0.177 0.321 -0.192 0.481 0.137 0.236 0.181 
 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.64 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
GROWTH -0.045 -0.066 -0.069 -0.071 0.072 0.096 -0.240 -0.080 -0.091 1 0.204 -0.045 0.123 -0.169 -0.135 0.156 -0.056 -0.020 
 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.27 
ROE -0.011 0.080 0.007 -0.083 -0.048 -0.022 0.128 -0.069 0.264 0.006 1 0.039 0.781 -0.198 0.253 0.248 0.016 0.044 
 0.56 0.00 0.70 0.00 0.01 0.24 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.76 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.40 0.02 
LEVERAGE 0.048 0.018 0.050 0.033 -0.033 -0.019 0.118 0.000 0.100 -0.089 -0.011 1 0.068 0.053 0.332 -0.040 -0.019 -0.019 
 0.01 0.33 0.01 0.08 0.08 0.30 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.00 0.56 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.29 0.30 
EP -0.020 0.087 -0.007 -0.078 -0.035 -0.011 0.108 -0.100 0.301 0.029 0.531 -0.055 1 0.115 0.325 0.150 0.000 0.012 
 0.27 0.00 0.71 0.00 0.06 0.54 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.98 0.52 
BP -0.089 -0.114 0.031 -0.031 -0.029 0.054 0.002 -0.019 -0.264 -0.084 -0.069 0.004 -0.178 1 0.080 -0.335 -0.071 -0.082 
 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.00 0.92 0.31 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.83 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
DP -0.185 -0.020 -0.008 -0.134 -0.029 0.050 -0.002 -0.118 0.130 -0.081 0.089 0.283 0.088 0.051 1 -0.008 0.012 0.069 
 0.00 0.27 0.65 0.00 0.11 0.01 0.92 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.67 0.52 0.00 
RRET -0.057 -0.027 -0.032 -0.057 0.036 0.047 -0.100 -0.098 0.030 0.105 0.116 -0.093 0.202 -0.282 -0.103 1 -0.052 -0.001 
 0.00 0.15 0.09 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.96 
NANALYST 0.466 0.219 0.040 0.268 -0.151 -0.192 0.162 0.361 0.257 -0.047 0.000 -0.042 0.010 -0.071 -0.061 -0.052 1 0.054 
 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.99 0.02 0.57 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
BIG4 0.036 0.092 -0.163 0.006 0.003 -0.075 0.141 0.041 0.185 -0.014 0.004 -0.030 0.027 -0.088 0.021 -0.007 0.050 1 
 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.75 0.86 0.00 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.46 0.83 0.11 0.14 0.00 0.25 0.71 0.01 0.00 
A
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Table 4 
Regression of U.S. institutional holdings on QC dummy and control variables 
  
    Zero-Inflated Beta  Heckman two stage 
      Full sample  Full sample 
    (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
MODEL    Selection Final  Selection Final 
VARIABLES  
Prediction 
Selection, Final  PCT_US PCT_US  RPW_US RPW_US 
              
QC  + , −  0.277*** -0.445***  0.164*** -2.174*** 
    (2.745) (-6.546)  (2.767) (-2.979) 
S&PTSX  −   -0.197**   -0.125**  
    (-2.208)   (-2.417)  
PROV_TAX  + , −  1.227 -3.983***  0.980 1.201 
    (0.546) (-2.973)  (0.754) (0.077) 
PROV_INCP  + , −  -0.080 0.150***  -0.040 0.328 
    (-1.079) (2.892)  (-0.941) (0.680) 
USCROSS  − , +  -1.140*** 0.747***  -0.679*** 0.118 
    (-10.329) (10.991)  (-10.695) (0.120) 
USSEGMENT  − , +  -0.729*** 0.485***  -0.424*** 0.474 
    (-5.528) (7.182)  (-5.610) (0.487) 
SIZE  − , +  -0.493*** 0.182***  -0.280*** -0.995** 
    (-14.326) (10.440)  (-14.712) (-2.136) 
GROWTH  − , +  -0.026 0.002  -0.014 -0.090 
    (-0.804) (0.146)  (-0.758) (-0.490) 
ROE  − , +  0.061 0.067  0.041 0.642 
    (0.618) (0.903)  (0.723) (0.935) 
AGE  ?  -0.157*** -0.010  -0.093*** -0.097 
    (-2.636) (-0.238)  (-2.783) (-0.220) 
LEVERAGE  ?  -0.180 0.422***  -0.066 8.640*** 
    (-0.851) (2.686)  (-0.553) (4.540) 
EP  ?  0.680*** 0.100  0.388*** 4.312*** 
    (4.167) (0.738)  (4.195) (2.747) 
BP  ?  0.133* 0.012  0.076* 2.052*** 
    (1.777) (0.222)  (1.776) (2.984) 
DP  ?  9.785*** -5.058***  5.023*** 1.093 
    (7.302) (-7.254)  (7.317) (0.163) 
RRET  ?  0.058 -0.147***  0.028 -0.319 
    (1.006) (-4.255)  (0.864) (-0.959) 
NANALYST  − , +  -1.972*** 0.517***  -1.005*** -8.339*** 
    (-8.307) (12.931)  (-9.170) (-4.942) 
BIG4  − , +  0.100 -0.188**  0.058 -0.220 
    (0.795) (-2.425)  (0.833) (-0.225) 
INVERSE_MILL  ?      11.673*** 
        (6.411) 
CONSTANT  ?  5.518*** -4.458***  3.180*** 3.695 
    (12.806) (-15.836)  (13.558) (0.969) 
Industry FE    YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE    YES YES  YES YES 
R-squared        0.3715 
ln_phi    1.739***     
    (41.913)     
Observations       8,089 8,089   8,089 2,956 
Robust t-statistics (z-statistics) in parentheses for ZOIB model (Heckman model)   
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors are clustered by industry and year   
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Table 5 
Regression of U.S. institutional holdings on QC dummy and control variables (alternate specifications and robustness) 
               
    Zero-inflated Beta  Simple OLS  Heckman two stage  Simple OLS 
    
Sample excluding 
Ontario firms  
 Full 
Sample  
Sample with 
non-zero 
holdings  
Sample excluding       
Ontario firms  
 Full 
Sample  
Sample 
with non-
zero 
holdings 
      (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
MODEL    Selection Final  Final Final  Selection Final  Final Final 
VARIABLES  
Prediction 
Selection, 
Final  PCT_US PCT_US  PCT_US PCT_US  RPW_US RPW_US  RPW_US RPW_US 
                         
QC  + , −  0.379*** -0.453***  -0.027*** -0.063***  0.212*** -1.605*  -1.209*** -3.191*** 
    (2.948) (-5.971)  (-8.300) (-7.407)  (2.866) (-1.776)  (-5.296) (-4.798) 
S&PTSX  −   -0.166      -0.103     
    (-1.420)      (-1.535)     
PROV_TAX  + , −  3.057 -4.135***  -0.214*** -0.423**  1.979 39.393**  -6.577 -12.640 
    (1.249) (-2.981)  (-3.395) (-2.330)  (1.393) (2.512)  (-1.209) (-0.799) 
PROV_INCP  + , −  -0.289*** 0.045  -0.003 0.010  -0.168*** -2.800***  -0.164 0.751 
    (-3.053) (0.677)  (-1.030) (1.299)  (-3.133) (-3.996)  (-0.924) (1.544) 
USCROSS  − , +  -0.907*** 0.651***  0.050*** 0.082***  -0.547*** -1.115  3.296*** 5.168*** 
    (-6.730) (8.653)  (10.743) (10.195)  (-7.087) (-0.998)  (8.019) (7.802) 
USSEGMENT  − , +  -1.157*** 0.346***  0.081*** 0.071***  -0.662*** -5.836***  5.102*** 4.141*** 
    (-5.643) (5.272)  (9.973) (7.935)  (-5.880) (-3.584)  (7.578) (5.471) 
               
CONTROLS    YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Industry FE    YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
Year FE    YES YES  YES YES  YES YES  YES YES 
R-squared       0.5157 0.5350   0.3978  0.3391 0.3895 
ln_phi    1.965***           
    (36.246)           
Observations       4,770 4,770   8,089 2,956   4,770 1,800   8,089 2,956 
Robust t-statistics (z-statistics) in parentheses for ZOIB and OLS models (Heckman model)        
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Errors are clustered by industry and year        
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Table 6  
 Panel A. US investor bias investigation: regression using matched pair sample 
Sample Consists of all the Quebec firm-years with non-zero US holdings, and their size matched non-zero-US-holding 
firms from Rest of Canada 
 
     Beta Model  OLS    
     (1)  (2)    
VARIABLES  Prediction  PCT_US  RPW_US    
             
QC  −  -0.596***  -3.879***    
    (-5.034)  (-3.273)    
PROV_TAX  −  -7.839**  -13.594    
    (-2.404)  (-0.399)    
PROV_INCP  −  0.357***  2.905**    
    (3.709)  (2.224)    
USCROSS  +  0.817***  5.077***    
    (6.943)  (3.417)    
USSEGMENT  +  0.508***  4.707***    
    (4.168)  (3.104)    
          
CONTROLS    YES  YES    
Industry FE    YES  YES    
Year FE    YES  YES    
          
R-squared      0.4637    
ln_phi    1.972***      
    (25.512)      
Observations       832   832    
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, errors clustered by industry and year 
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Table 7 
Descriptive Statistics: US Institutional holdings of Quebec firms (Only firm-years with non-zero holdings) 
               
 Above Median FRENCHNESS  Below Median FRENCHNESS  Difference 
 Count Mean P25 Median P75  Count Mean P25 Median P75  in Mean 
FRENCHNESS 193 0.430 0.323 0.400 0.521  193 0.123 0.054 0.122 0.192  0.307 *** 
WEB 193 4.535 2.708 4.595 5.872  193 4.788 3.466 4.477 5.908  -0.253  
FPCT_US 193 0.074 0.002 0.010 0.088  193 0.134 0.003 0.037 0.213  -0.059 *** 
RPW_US 193 5.471 0.034 0.270 2.267  193 6.432 0.081 0.727 3.453  -0.961  
USSEGMENT 193 1.762 0.000 0.000 2.000  193 1.984 0.000 0.000 3.000  -0.223  
PROV_TAX 193 0.102 0.090 0.099 0.119  193 0.102 0.090 0.099 0.119  0.000  
PROV_INCP 193 0.409 0.000 0.000 1.000  193 0.290 0.000 0.000 1.000  0.119 * 
AGE 193 19.8 7.0 17.0 26.0  193 21.4 11.0 17.0 29.0  -1.5  
USCROSS 193 0.461 0.000 0.000 1.000  193 0.684 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.223 *** 
SIZE 193 3893.7 256.9 1199.5 5412.7  193 5328.1 337.4 1304.9 3854.8  -1434.4  
GROWTH 193 0.242 -0.018 0.081 0.195  193 0.100 -0.005 0.079 0.173  0.142 * 
ROE 193 0.059 -0.017 0.113 0.188  193 0.119 0.057 0.138 0.208  -0.060  
LEVERAGE 193 0.217 0.058 0.207 0.315  193 0.227 0.116 0.229 0.341  -0.010  
EP 193 0.002 -0.012 0.051 0.078  193 0.018 0.031 0.056 0.076  -0.015  
BP 193 0.586 0.351 0.519 0.699  193 0.647 0.348 0.482 0.771  -0.061  
DP 193 0.017 0.000 0.012 0.025  193 0.018 0.000 0.009 0.024  -0.001  
RRET 193 0.187 -0.131 0.098 0.331  193 0.169 -0.139 0.116 0.353  0.018  
NANALYST 193 0.777 0.000 0.000 0.000  193 2.363 0.000 0.000 3.000  -1.585 *** 
BIG4 193 0.865 1.000 1.000 1.000  193 0.808 1.000 1.000 1.000  0.057  
 
Note: variable definitions are given in Table 1.  AGE, SIZE, and NANALYST are logged in the analysis but are reported here unlogged to 
aid in their interpretation. There are 416 Quebec firm-years with non-zero holdings, but only 386 of them have an Internet presence in 
a specific year that can be identified, resulting in two samples of 193 firm-years.  
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Table 8 
Regression of U.S. institutional holdings on FRENCHNESS and 
control variables 
       
    Beta Model  OLS 
    
Only Non-Zero 
Holdings  
Only Non-
Zero Holdings 
      (1)  (2) 
VARIABLES  Prediction  PCT_US  RPW_US 
           
FRENCHNESS  −  -0.671**  -7.911* 
    (-2.567)  (-1.732) 
WEB  ?  0.0217  0.112 
    (0.289)  (0.181) 
PROV_INCP  −  -0.0109  -1.240 
    (-0.0618)  (-0.850) 
USCROSS  +  0.863***  6.205*** 
    (5.925)  (2.989) 
USSEGMENT  +  0.0698  -2.000 
    (0.365)  (-0.622) 
       
CONTROLS    YES  YES 
Industry FE    YES  YES 
Year FE    YES  YES 
R-squared      0.528 
ln_phi    2.947***   
    (26.12)   
Observations       386   386 
Robust t-statistics in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, errors 
clustered by industry and year 
 
There are 416 Quebec firm-year observations, but only 386 of them 
have the required online presence in a year. See Appendix 2 for details. 
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Table 9 
Descriptive Statistics: European institutional holdings of Canadian firms 
               
Panel A: UK investor holdings of Canadian firms (only firm-years with non-zero holdings) 
               
 Quebec  Rest of Canada  Difference 
 Count Mean P25 Median P75  Count Mean P25 Median P75  in Mean 
PCT_UK(%) 459 0.67% 0.05% 0.18% 0.58%  2319 1.21% 0.05% 0.23% 1.17%  -0.005 *** 
RPW_UK 459 11.372 0.226 1.349 5.393  2319 25.335 0.455 3.226 19.079  -13.963 *** 
EUSEGMENT 459 0.192 0.000 0.000 0.000  2319 0.134 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.058 *** 
EUCROSS 459 0.414 0.000 0.000 1.000  2319 0.559 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.145 *** 
PROV_TAX 459 0.103 0.090 0.099 0.119  2319 0.114 0.100 0.115 0.120  -0.011 *** 
PROV_INCP 459 0.351 0.000 0.000 1.000  2319 0.564 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.213 *** 
A 
 
              
Panel B: French investor holdings of Canadian firms (only firm-years with non-zero holdings) 
               
 Quebec  Rest of Canada  Difference 
 Count Mean P25 Median P75  Count Mean P25 Median P75  in Mean 
PCT_FRANCE(%) 231 0.14% 0.02% 0.05% 0.11%  1231 0.27% 0.02% 0.07% 0.25%  -0.13% *** 
RPW_FRANCE 231 18.739 0.553 2.113 9.921  1231 27.135 1.360 5.321 29.480  -8.396 ** 
EUSEGMENT 231 0.260 0.000 0.000 1.000  1231 0.167 0.000 0.000 0.000  0.093 *** 
EUCROSS 231 0.537 0.000 1.000 1.000  1231 0.705 0.000 1.000 1.000  -0.168 *** 
PROV_TAX 231 0.103 0.090 0.099 0.119  1231 0.112 0.100 0.115 0.120  -0.010 *** 
PROV_INCP 231 0.281 0.000 0.000 1.000  1231 0.483 0.000 0.000 1.000  -0.201 *** 
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Table 10 
Regression of UK and French institutional holdings on Quebec dummy and control variables 
    Differenced  Stacked   Differenced  Stacked 
    Heckman  OLS  
Stacked 
Sample (OLS)  Heckman  OLS  
Stacked 
Sample (OLS) 
      (1)  (2) (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) (7)  (8) 
    
Final-
Stage 
 
full 
sample 
non-zero 
holdings 
 
 non-zero 
holdings  
   
full 
sample 
non-zero 
holdings 
 
non-zero 
holdings 
VARIABLES  
Prediction     
Dif, 
Stacked  PCTDIF  PCTDIF PCTDIF  PCT_i  RPWDIF  RPWDIF RPWDIF  RPW_i 
                         
QC  −  -0.002**  -0.001** -0.002**  -0.003***  -5.906**  -1.307* -5.820***  -4.257** 
    (-2.086)  (-2.480) (-2.204)  (-4.190)  (-2.546)  (-1.819) (-2.655)  (-2.415) 
FRANCE  ?       -0.010***       0.958 
         (-8.162)       (0.740) 
QC*FRANCE  +       0.005***       5.816** 
         (5.972)       (2.502) 
PROV_TAX  ? , −  0.030  0.006 0.035*  0.008  236.540***  80.547*** 256.082***  191.844*** 
    (1.622)  (0.841) (1.804)  (0.536)  (4.010)  (3.973) (4.028)  (3.789) 
PROV_INCP  ? , −  -0.001*  -0.000 -0.001*  -0.001**  1.151  0.761 0.957  -1.589 
    (-1.817)  (-1.362) (-1.925)  (-2.572)  (0.646)  (1.118) (0.552)  (-1.011) 
EUCROSS  ? , +  0.005***  0.003*** 0.003***  0.003***  3.446  1.095 0.006  1.980 
    (5.795)  (5.469) (4.233)  (5.088)  (1.593)  (1.059) (0.003)  (1.115) 
EUSEGMENT  ? , +  0.003**  0.001* 0.003**  0.002**  8.248**  3.939** 8.773**  11.457*** 
    (2.183)  (1.755) (2.467)  (2.120)  (2.417)  (2.256) (2.511)  (3.331) 
                 
CONTROLS    YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
Industry FE    YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
Year FE    YES  YES YES  YES  YES  YES YES  YES 
R-squared    0.2222  0.1476 0.2078  0.2520  0.1438  0.0379 0.1297  0.2616 
Observations       2,900   8,089 2,900   4,240   2,900   8,089 2,900   4,240 
Robust t-statistics (z-statistics) in parentheses for OLS (Heckman), *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1, errors Clustered by industry and year.  PCTDIF = PCT_UK – PCT_FRANCE and RPWDIF 
= RPW_UK – RPW_FRANCE.  For the Stacked Sample, one observation is a firm-year-country. When indicator variable FRANCE is 0, then PCT_i = PCT_UK, and when the indicator 
variable FRANCE is 1, then PCT_i = PCT_FRANCE.  RPW_i is constructed in the same way.   
 
 
